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Abstract
The most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces financial risk. But since insurance opens up new
opportunities for consuming expensive high-technology care which permits health improvements that are
valued by the insured, and because in many settings the provider is able and has an incentive to exploit the
informational advantage he has over the patient, it is not immediately obvious that insurance will in practice
reduce financial risk. The authors analyze the effect of insurance on the probability of an individual incurring
"high" annual health expenses using data from three household surveys-one a cross-section survey, the other
two panel surveys. All come from China, a country where providers have until recently largely been paid fee-
for-service (often according to a schedule that encourages the overprovision of high-technology care and the
underprovision of basic care) and who are only lightly regulated. The authors define annual spending as "high"
if it exceeds 5 percent of average income in the sample and as "catastrophic" if it exceeds 10 percent of the
household's own per capita income. The estimates of the effect of insurance on financial risk allow for the
possible endogeneity of health insurance in the panel datasets by allowing for a time-invariant fixed effect
capturing unobserved risk that may be correlated with insurance status, and in the cross-section dataset by
using instrumental variables, where availability of and eligibility for health insurance are used as instruments.
The results suggest that during the 1990s China's government and labor insurance schemes increased financial
risk associated with household health care spending, but that the rural cooperative medical scheme
significantly reduced financial risk in some areas but increased it in others (though not significantly). From the
results, it appears that China's new health insurance schemes (private schemes, including coverage of
schoolchildren) have also increased the risk of high levels of out-of-pocket spending on health. Where the
authors find evidence of health insurance increasing the risk of "high" out-of-pocket expenses, the marginal
effect is of the order of 15-20 percent; in the case of "catastrophic" expenses, it is even larger.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces financial risk. The classic 
textbook argument in the case of health insurance has an individual facing a known probability 
of falling ill and a corresponding known reduction in wealth caused by the medical expenses 
necessitated by falling ill. If offered full and actuarially fair insurance the risk-averse individual 
accepts it, preferring to pay the corresponding premium thereby securing a certain wealth equal 
to the expected wealth in the absence of insurance. The benefit of insurance is the reduction in 
risk—the knowledge that whether or not illness occurs, wealth is the same in both states. 
Relaxing the assumption that insurance offered is full leaves the risk-averse individual preferring 
insurance, because although not eliminated, the risk associated with illness is substantially 
reduced.  
How this characterization of health insurance plays out in practice—and therefore how 
far health insurance protects people from financial risk—has been the subject of very little 
empirical research. Yet it is not obvious that in the real world health insurance always reduces 
risk. Contrary to the textbook example, there is not a fixed financial loss associated with illness, 
or even with each type of illness. A wide variety of tests and interventions can be undertaken, 
even for patients with similar conditions. Patients are not indifferent to the type and extent of 
care they receive, because in contrast to the textbook model, they derive utility from health status 
as well as financial wealth, and additional tests and interventions may be expected—at least up to 
a point—to increase the chances of a recovery. So, patients have an incentive to engage in ex 
post moral hazard, even if this increases their out-of-pocket payments compared to the simple 
textbook scenario. Insurance opens up new opportunities for consuming expensive high-tech care 
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(Nyman 1999), and it is conceivable that the insured values the health improvement so much that 
with insurance he ends up paying more out of pocket when ill than he does without insurance. 
This outcome becomes more likely in a setting where the provider is able to exploit the 
informational advantage she has over the patient, so that the patient finds it hard to trade off the 
extra costs and the extra medical care. This seems less likely to happen the greater is the control 
that the insurer has over the care delivered by the provider for a given medical condition (e.g. by 
paying them prospectively according to diagnosis-related groups), the greater the degree of self-
regulation by the medical profession, and the stronger is any ombudsman or other authority 
acting on behalf of patients.  
In many countries, especially developing countries, these checks on provider behavior are 
typically very limited if not largely absent. This is true of China, which is the setting for the 
present paper. Health insurers there have only recently begun to pay providers on a prospective 
basis, and even now in most urban areas and almost all rural areas providers are paid fee-for-
service (FFS) by insurers.1 Furthermore, the government-set schedules for fees and medicines in 
China provided physicians with a strong incentive to favor high-tech care over basic care. For 
basic interventions, the government has set the price below cost so as to make them affordable 
even to fairly poor patients, while more sophisticated interventions are priced above cost to 
enable providers to make profits on them that can be used to cross-subsidize the delivery of basic 
interventions. The incentive, of course, is to encourage providers to supply sophisticated care 
wherever possible. Unsurprisingly, even low-level facilities have acquired sophisticated medical 
equipment, and there is evidence the care the system delivers is more costly and more 
sophisticated than is medically necessary (cf. Liu and Mills 1999). The incentive to over-treat is 
                                                 
1  More details are provided in section II.   
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accentuated where there is a third party picking up part of the cost, especially one that is simply 
reimbursing (a fraction of) the costs incurred by the provider. Self-regulation by the Chinese 
medical profession is limited, and while the Chinese government has identified the delivery of 
unnecessary and poor quality care as a matter for concern, there are no formal complaint 
procedures for patients who feel that they have been over-treated. In such a setting, it seems 
perfectly plausible that at least some patients may end up not only getting more care than would 
have been the case if they had been uninsured but also paying more out of pocket. Insurance in 
such a setting may, in other words, actually increase the probability of large out-of-pocket 
payments and hence exposure to financial risk.  
There have already been some studies that claim to explore the extent to which health 
insurance reduces financial risk or ‘financial protection’.  Mostly, these do so by looking at the 
effects of health insurance on expected health care payments.2 However, this does not get at the 
question of risk. Indeed, in the classic textbook case of actuarially fair insurance, expected health 
care payments, gross of the premium, are the same with and without insurance. A better 
approach, but one adopted in only one paper to date to our knowledge, is to model the impact of 
insurance on the probability of individuals incurring ‘large’ out-of-pocket payments.3 One could 
define ‘large’ either in relation to the household’s own per capita income (or consumption), or in 
relation to the sample average income (or consumption). We employ both approaches, using data 
from three separate surveys spanning the period 1991-2004 and covering half of China’s 32 
provinces.   
                                                 
2  See, for example, the studies in Preker and Carrin (2003).   
3  O’Donnell et al. (2005) explore the factors influencing the probability of a household having catastrophic health care payments, 
defined as payments that exceed 10% of per capita household consumption. In only three of the six territories studied, do 
O’Donnell et al. include health insurance: in Hong Kong, no significant effect is found; in Thailand, the only insurance category 
with a significant coefficient is the ‘other cover’, and the sign is positive; in Vietnam, insurance is modeled as the number of 
household members with insurance, and the significant coefficients are negative (they are for the number of children and adults 
aged less than 65). Unlike the regressions reported in this paper, their regressions are estimated at the household level and do not 
control for health status.  
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II. HEALTH INSURANCE IN CHINA—SOME SALIENT FACTS 
Under China’s pre-reform planned economy, almost all citizens were covered by some 
form of health insurance. Agricultural workers were covered by the old commune-based 
cooperative medical scheme (CMS), state-owned enterprise (SOE) workers were covered by the 
Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS), and civil servants and other government workers were covered 
by the Government Insurance Scheme (GIS).  There were some gaps in coverage (not all urban 
schemes covered dependents, for example), but the gaps were relatively small (during the 1970s 
the CMS covered an estimated 90% of the rural population).  
China’s transition from a planned to a market economy from 1980 onwards brought 
dramatic reductions in health insurance coverage. The decollectivization of agriculture resulted 
in an almost total collapse of the CMS. By 1993 less than 10% of the rural population had health 
insurance.4 The mid-late 1990s saw several attempts to resuscitate the CMS, but despite these 
initiatives, CMS coverage nationally remained stubbornly low.  By 2003 80% of China’s rural 
population—some 640 million people—lacked health insurance. In that year, half of the rural 
residents in 2003 who said they did have insurance said they were covered by either private (i.e. 
commercial) insurance or ‘other’ insurance, up from 31% in 1993.  
Coverage in China’s cities has also declined, though less dramatically than in rural areas. 
As China transitioned to a market economy, the SOE—the backbone of the LIS—came under 
increasing pressure. LIS coverage fell, as did GIS coverage. By 1998 nearly half the urban 
population lacked insurance coverage. A variety of reforms have been introduced, including the 
                                                 
4  Figures on coverage are from China’s National Health Survey (NHS), undertaken by the Ministry of Health (MOH) in 1993, 
1998 and 2003. The figures for 1993 and 1998 are published in Gao et al. (2002). The urban insurance figures for 2003 are taken 
from “Health Services Utilization and Urban Health Insurance Reform in China”, a presentation by Ling Xu of China’s MOH in 
December 2004 at an MOH seminar on the 2003 NHS. The rural figures for 2003 are from “Main Findings from the 3rd NHS 
Survey”, available online at www.moh.gov.cn, accessed on April 21st, 2005.  
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setting up in 1998 of a new single urban scheme known as Basic Medical Insurance (BMI), into 
which LIS and GIS are gradually being subsumed. Despite these reforms, coverage by 
GIS/LIS/BMI continued to fall between 1998 and 2003. Had it not been for the growth of private 
and ‘other’ insurance schemes—these together covered 30% of the urban insured in 2003, 
compared to just 10% in 1993—coverage in urban China would have fallen below 40% in 2003.  
Until fairly recently, providers in China—even those delivering care to insured patients—
were paid on a FFS basis. Those CMS schemes that survived during the 1990s simply 
reimbursed their members’ medical bills, and made little attempt to restrict their choice of 
provider. Prior to the reform process that started in the mid-1990s, the same was true of the LIS 
and GIS. Members paid very little out of their own pockets, and providers were paid on a FFS 
basis. Unsurprisingly, costs increased rapidly, exacerbated by the continuous introduction of 
ever-more-costly medical technology. In 1995, the government launched a health insurance pilot 
experiment in the cities of Zhenjiang (Jiangsu province) and Jiujiang (Jiangxi province) (cf. e.g. 
Liu, Cai et al. 2001; Liu and et al. 2003). Among the key elements of the reform was the setting-
up of a citywide insurance pool across all work units, financed jointly by employers and 
employees. The pooled funds were then distributed into individual Medical Savings Accounts 
(MSA) and a Social Pooling Account (SPA). Supply-side cost-sharing was also introduced, 
although not until 1997 in Zhenjiang. At the end of 1996, the experiment reform was extended to 
57 other cities, and in December 1998 the government called for reform of the existing GIS and 
LIS in China’s remaining cities. By the end of 2003, the vast majority of large cities had 
implemented the new BMI program, covering over 109 million urban employees. China’s 
smaller cities are still in the process of implementing these reforms.   
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III. METHODS, DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
We model the effect of insurance on the probability of an individual incurring large 
annual out-of-pocket payments, with large being defined relative either to the sample average 
income or the per capita income of the individual’s own household.  
Use of a basic probit or logit model on cross-section data could reasonably be criticized 
on the grounds that selection into health insurance is non-random and occurs in such a way as to 
generate a correlation between the insurance dummy and the error term. This could in principle 
apply to the CMS, GIS/LIS schemes and private/other schemes. In the case of the CMS scheme, 
it seems more likely that any selection is adverse to the scheme: people with unobservables that 
predispose them to a higher-than-expected risk of ‘high’ expenses are more likely to enroll, 
biasing the coefficient on insurance upwards. In the case of the GIS/LIS scheme, and possibly 
the private/other category as well, the bias seems likely to be in the opposite direction: the 
scheme’s members are likely to have a very low risk compared to the population at large, and we 
may only partially capture this by the observables that we enter in our probit model. We try to 
get round the possible endogeneity of insurance in two different ways, depending on the dataset. 
Two of the three household surveys we use are panels. These permit us to allow for an 
unobserved time-invariant fixed effect capturing unobserved risk, which could be correlated with 
insurance coverage; the model we use in these surveys is a fixed-effect logit model (cf. e.g. 
Wooldridge 2002). In the cross-section survey, we use instrumental variables (IV). We capture 
insurance coverage using two variables, the first indicating whether the individual is a member 
of a CMS, the second capturing membership of the GIS or LIS.5 As instruments for our 
insurance variables, we use a variable capturing whether or not a CMS exists in the village where 
                                                 
5  In the survey in question, very few respondents said they had private or ‘other’ insurance. This reflects the date of the survey 
(1998) and the fact that it covers China’s poorer western and central provinces.  
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the individual lives, and a vector of variables capturing employment status (not just whether 
employed but also type of job) which should proxy eligibility for GIS/LIS. Both our instruments 
can plausibly be argued to be correlated with the probability of the individual being insured (for 
example, a peasant farmer is most unlikely to be insured with GIS or LIS), but neither seems 
likely to influence the probability of the individual having unduly high health spending, once we 
have controlled for health insurance and our other covariates, such as household income, 
education, and so on.  
Our surveys are listed in Table 1. They vary in several important dimensions. One is 
geographic coverage: the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) covers just Gansu 
province; the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) covers mostly central and eastern 
provinces; and the World Bank Health VIII project baseline survey (H8BS) cover mostly the 
poorer central and western provinces. Another difference is the rural-urban focus within 
provinces: the GSCF and the H8BS are rural-only surveys, while the CHNS covers urban and 
rural areas. A third difference is the panel dimension: the CHNS and GSCF are both panels, 
while the H8BS is a cross-section. There are other less obvious differences, as will become 
apparent below.  
Variable definitions and notes on the variables are provided in Table 2. Out-of-pocket 
health spending is for a 4-week window in the case of the CHNS, and for one-year windows in 
the two other surveys. In the CHNS, out-of-pocket expenses are explicitly net of any 
reimbursement; in the other surveys, respondents are not explicitly asked about reimbursement. 
Information on income is most complete in the CHNS, the GSCF has the second most detailed 
income information, while income in the H8BS is based on just one question. The low per capita 
income in the H8BS undoubtedly reflects in part the fact that the sample was drawn from 
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China’s poorest provinces. But it also probably reflects the limitations of the single-question 
approach to eliciting income in household surveys. We have trimmed outliers on both the out-of-
pocket payments and income distributions: the top half of one percent of cases on the out-of-
pocket payments distribution and the bottom half of one percent of cases on the income 
distribution were removed. We define health expenses as ‘high’ if they exceed 5% of the sample 
mean per capita household income, and as ‘catastrophic’ if they exceed 10% of the household’s 
own per capita income (cf. e.g. Ranson 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu, Evans et al. 
2003).  As is apparent from Table 3, the rates reporting ‘high’ and ‘catastrophic’ out-of-pocket 
payments vary considerably across the surveys (the CHNS having far lower rates), and to a lesser 
extent over time within each of the two longitudinal surveys.6 The far lower rates in the CHNS 
reflect in part the relatively low out-of-pocket payment amounts in our data. The shares are well 
below those in the Chinese Rural Household Survey, for example. In part, this probably reflects 
the relatively large number of cases in the CHNS with missing values for the various questions 
on medical expenses. We have adopted a conservative strategy in such cases, by replacing 
missing values by zero. Since missing values are somewhat more common in the data among 
those with insurance, we will end up underestimating the effect of insurance on the probability of 
‘high’ or ‘catastrophic’ medical expenses.   
Health insurance coverage varies across the surveys and across waves in the case of the 
longitudinal surveys. There is no clear trend in the case of the CHNS in the fraction of the 
sample with some form of coverage, although a continued decline of the traditional schemes 
                                                 
6  It seems likely that the short (4-week) recall period used in the CHNS would result in a larger annualized out-of-pocket 
spending figure than the long (12-month) recall period used in the other two surveys. This is borne out by analysis of data from 
the 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Survey, which inquires about health spending over a 12-month period, and about use of 
services and medical expenses during the last 4 weeks. Responses to the spending questions covering the last 12 months produce 
a budget share (share of per capita household consumption) of 5.2%, while the questions covering the last 4 weeks produce an 
annualized budget share of 9.1%. The fractions of the sample with ‘high’ and ‘catastrophic’ expenses, defined along the lines of 
the present paper, are also higher when the 4-week questions are used.  
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(GIS, LIS and CMS) is evident. In the case of Gansu, the rise in coverage between 2000 and 
2004 seems to be due to an expansion of insurance coverage among children for which the 
contributions (and presumably the benefits) are fairly low. Considerable provincial variation in 
insurance coverage is evident in the H8BS, especially in the CMS which was operating in only 
two provinces in 1998.   
As covariates, we include health status, per capita household income, schooling, and in 
the case of the cross-section age, gender, ethnicity, marital status and the number of children 
aged 5 or less. Two of the surveys contain self-assessed health (in the GSCF, the assessment was 
actually done by the woman of the household), which at least in industrialized countries has been 
found to be a good predictor of mortality and the onset of disability (cf. Idler and Benyamini 
1997). In the case of the H8BS, no self-assessment of health is available, and we used instead a 
chronic illness dummy. We have measured schooling by years of schooling in the CHNS and the 
GSCF, but in the H8BS have left education coded as levels of attainment. In each of the panel 
models, we include wave fixed effects as well as individual-specific fixed effects.   
IV. RESULTS  
The basic CHNS results are reported in Table 4, the results for the Gansu panel in Table 
6, and the results for the Health VIII baseline survey in Table 7.  Additional results for the CNHS 
are reported in Table 5.  
We discuss first the effects of the covariates. In all models, (increasingly) poor health 
significantly raises the probability of an individual experiencing ‘high’ or ‘catastrophic’ health 
payments. The probability of ‘high’ out-of-pocket payments varies somewhat with per capita 
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income, but the majority of the significant coefficients are positive. By contrast, higher per capita 
incomes are associated with a significantly lower probability of ‘catastrophic’ health expenses. It 
is known (Van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2005) that China is unusual by Asian standards in that 
‘catastrophic’ payments in most other countries are concentrated among the better off. These 
results show that even after controlling for the other covariates in our models, a higher income 
reduces the probability of experiencing ‘catastrophic’ health expenses. Like O’Donnell et al. 
(2005), we find some evidence that higher levels of education, holding constant per capita 
income, reduces the probability of ‘catastrophic’ expenses. In the H8BS, the effects of ethnicity 
vary somewhat across the provinces, as do the effects of having small children in the house: for 
the most part, however, being from China’s Han majority seems to lower one’s chances of 
experiencing ‘high’ and ‘catastrophic’ expenses, while having young children in the household 
increases them.  
Turning to the insurance effects, we find evidence across all surveys in support of the 
hypothesis that health insurance can increase financial risk. There is, however, some 
heterogeneity in effects by type of scheme, and by locality.  
In our basic results for the CHNS data (Table 4) we find a significant effect of health 
insurance on the probabilities of incurring ‘high’ and ‘catastrophic’ health expenses in the 
sample as a whole and in the urban subsample, but not in rural areas. The marginal effect in the 
urban subsample indicates that health insurance raises the probabilities of ‘high’ and 
‘catastrophic’ medical expenses by 11.3 and 14.5 percent respectively. In Table 5, we find that in 
urban areas, it is worker insurance (presumably LIS) and ‘other’ insurance (quite likely private 
insurance) that are associated with an increased risk of ‘high’ and ‘catastrophic’ health expenses, 
with ‘other’ health insurance raising the probability of ‘high’ out-of-pocket payments in urban 
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areas by 20 percent. We also find that, although we find no significant effect for the blanket 
insurance coverage variable in rural areas in Table 4, we find a borderline significant positive 
effect for CMS when we separate out cover by scheme in Table 5. Work unit insurance cover 
also emerges with a positive and borderline significant effect in rural areas. We find some 
evidence, as reported at the bottom of Table 4, that in rural areas the effect of insurance varies by 
province.  
The evidence from the Gansu panel (Table 6) is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
health insurance can increase financial risk, and the marginal effect is non-negligible. This is 
despite the fact the insurance seems to reflect mostly insurance for school children, and the fact 
that the primary sampling units are all rural areas.  
The results for the Health VIII cross-section survey in Table 7 are sensitive to whether or 
not we treat insurance as endogenous, especially so in the case of GIS/LIS. The relative 
insensitivity of the CMS effect to the use of IV reflects the fact that CMS operated in only two of 
the seven provinces sampled (Henan and Guizhou), and in the villages where it existed, most 
people surveyed were members. The direction of bias in the case of the GIS/LIS effect is 
consistent with our speculation earlier that this scheme has a high favorable risk profile whose 
effect we can only partially control for through our observed covariates. The failure to take into 
account the endogeneity of insurance status in the case of GIS/LIS results in a substantial 
underestimate of the effect of insurance on the probability of high out-of-pocket health spending, 
and the IV marginal effects are similar in size to those from the CHNS. Treating insurance as 
endogenous also makes the difference between the effect being significant and not. The results in 
Table 7 suggest that in the few villages where it existed, CMS reduced the risk of unduly high 
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household health spending. By contrast, membership of GIS or LIS significantly increased the 
risk, by 20 percent or so.  
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that health insurance need not 
always reduce financial risk. Our measures of risk are the probability of an individual spending 
more than 5% of average income and the probability of an individual spending more than 10% of 
per capita household income on health. Our estimates of the effect of insurance on financial risk 
allow for the possible endogeneity of health insurance, either by allowing for a time-invariant 
fixed effect capturing unobserved risk that may be correlated with insurance status, or by using 
instrumental variables, where as instruments we use variables capturing the availability of or 
eligibility for health insurance. Results from two separate surveys (the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey, or CHNS, and the Health VIII baseline survey, or H8BS) suggest that during 
the 1990s China’s government and labor insurance schemes (GIS and LIS) increased financial 
risk associated with household health care spending. Evidence on the success of the rural 
cooperative medical scheme (CMS) in reducing financial risk is mixed: the CHNS suggests CMS 
increased risk, but not significantly, while the H8BS suggests that CMS significantly reduced 
risk. Two surveys (the CHNS and the Gansu Survey of Children and Families) both suggest that 
China’s new health insurance schemes (‘other’ and private schemes, including those that cover 
schoolchildren, as in the Gansu survey) may be associated with increased risk of large out-of-
pocket payments. Where we find evidence of health insurance increasing the risk of ‘high’ out-
of-pocket expenses, the marginal effect is of the order 15-20 percent. In the case of the CHNS, 
our treatment of missing values is likely to result in this being an underestimate.  
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The welfare implications of these findings are not clear-cut. Individuals are likely to 
weigh any extra risk of large out-of-pocket payments against the additional health gains from 
being able to receive more extensive and more sophisticated medical care once insured. On 
balance, people may be better off despite facing a higher financial risk. If, however, providers 
exploit their informational advantage and take the opportunity of insurance coverage to deliver 
more expensive medical care that the individual would not have chosen had he been fully aware 
of the magnitude of the additional health benefits and additional out-of-pocket expenses, then the 
welfare gains associated with insurance are less clear.  
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Table 1: Surveys Used 
 China Health & Nutrition Survey (CHNS) Gansu Survey of Children and 
Families (GSCF) 
World Bank China Health VIII project baseline survey 
Provinces sampled  Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang (1997 and 2000 
only), Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning (not 
1997), Shandong  
Gansu (1) Anhui, Chongqing, Gansu, Guizhou, Henan, Qinghai, 
Shanxi  
No. counties sampled 36  20  28  
Rural or urban or both Both Rural Rural 
Areas covered Where possible, the provincial capital and a lower-
income city were selected, though in two provinces, 
other large cities had to be selected.  Villages and 
townships within the counties, and urban and 
suburban neighborhoods within the cities were 
sampled.  
Villages only  Villages and townships  
Sampling strategy  A multistage, random cluster process was used to 
draw the sample surveyed in each of the provinces, 
which themselves sampled vary substantially in 
geography, economic development, public resources, 
and health indicators. Counties in the 9 provinces 
were stratified by income (low, middle, and high) and 
a weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly 
select 4 counties in each province.  Villages and 
townships within the counties and urban and suburban 
neighborhoods within the cities were selected 
randomly.7  
A four-stage stratified random 
sample was used. First counties 
were selected (20), then 
townships (42), then villages 
(100) and finally children.  At 
each stage care a sampling 
procedure was used to ensure that 
sampling was done evenly across 
the income distribution.8  
Survey was administered only in project counties9 
which were deliberately selected on the basis of their 
high rates of poverty, their capacity to implement the 
project, and their financial resources (counties were 
responsible for repaying the loan to the World Bank). 
Within counties, a random cluster process was used to 
draw households.  
Date(s) conducted  1991, 1993, 1997, 200010 2000, 2003 1998 
Sample size (no. individuals) 
per wave 
14,578; 13,687; 14,181; 15,334  7,581; 7,581 42,799 
                                                 
7  Details taken from CHNS website http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china.   
8  Further details are to be found at the GSFC website http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/china/gscf/mainGscf.htm.   
9  The survey covers 22 of the 96 counties eventually included in the Health VIII project.  The 22 counties are located in the following provinces in central and western  China: Anhui, 
Chongqing, Gansu, Guizhou, Henan, Qinghai and Shanxi.     
10 The CHNS also collected data in 1989.  This wave was excluded from the present analysis because some of the variables were not collected in the 1989 wave.   
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Table 2: Variable definitions 
 China Health & Nutrition Survey (CHNS) Gansu Survey of Families and Children (GSCF) World Bank China Health VIII project 
baseline survey 
Out-of-pocket 
health spending 
Total health care expenditures during last month, including 
expenditures not associated with a provider visit, expenditures 
associated with first visit to providers (if applicable), 
expenditures associated with visit to second provider, additional 
health care expenditures, minus expenditure reimbursed by 
health insurance (1989 prices).  The top half of 1% of 
observations in each wave have been trimmed.   
Sum of expenditure associated with doctor visits 
and drug purchases during last 12 months.   
Annual expenses on drugs, prevention 
and health care of the family. The top 
half of 1% of observations in each 
wave have been trimmed.   
High out-of-
pocket spending 
Annualized out-of-pocket spending in excess of 5% of mean per 
capita income for the wave in question 
Out-of-pocket spending in excess of 5% of mean 
per capita income for the wave in question  
Out-of-pocket spending in excess of 
5% of mean per capita income  
Catastrophic out-
of-pocket 
spending 
Annualized out-of-pocket spending in excess of 10% of 
household’s own per capita income for the wave in question 
Out-of-pocket spending in excess of 10% of 
household’s own per capita income for the wave in 
question  
Out-of-pocket spending in excess of 
10% of household’s own per capita 
income  
Health insurance A dummy indicating whether they person has any cover. Also a 
series of dummies, capturing whether they had any of the 
following types cover, namely public, worker, dependent, work 
unit, cooperative, maternal and child health prepayment scheme, 
immunization prepayment scheme, ‘other’, unknown.  
A dummy indicating whether the person has any 
cover.  
A dummy indicating whether the 
person had any cover. Also dummies, 
capturing whether they were a member 
of a CMS or GIS/LIS schemes (people 
saying they had one of the following: 
government employee insurance; labor 
insurance; half labor insurance;  
medical insurance; coordinated 
arrangement; others).  
Self-assessed 
health  
4-point scale 5-point scale  n/a  
Chronic health Not used Not used A dummy indicating whether the 
individual has a diagnosed chronic 
disease.   
Per capita 
income 
Total household income from all sources divided by number of 
household members (1989 prices).  The bottom half of 1% of 
observations in each wave have been trimmed.   
Income from agriculture, livestock, wages and self-
employment. Wage income includes bonuses, 
subsidies, and the value of in-kind payments. 
Household was asked its total 
household income in the previous year. 
This was divided by the number of 
household members to get per capita 
income. The bottom half of 1% of 
observations in each wave have been 
trimmed.   
Education  Years of education.  Years of education.  No education (omitted category), 
elementary school, primary middle 
school, senior middle school, 
vocational school, junior college.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, by survey and wave 
 CHNS GSCF H8BS 
 1991 1993 1997 2000 2000 2004 1998 
High out-of-pocket payments   3.3% 1.9% 2.9% 3.4% 21.6% 15.0% 56.5% 
Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments  2.7% 1.6% 2.5% 2.9% 19.0% 14.1% 35.2% 
Out-of-pocket payment share 2.0% 1.6% 2.2% 7.4% 15.9% 13.9% 12.9% 
Health insurance 27.0% 23.1% 23.8% 20.0% 0.3% 18.2% 4.0% 
Public insurance 11.2% 10.6% 8.2% 7.1%    
Worker insurance 6.7% 4.9% 3.8% 3.7%    
Dependents’ insurance 1.7% 1.2% 0.5% 0.2%    
Work unit insurance 3.7% 0.5% 8.2% 5.0%    
Cooperative medical insurance 0.2% 2.4% 0.7% 0.4%    
MCH insurance 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%    
Planned immunization insurance 2.8% 1.8% 0.8% 0.8%    
Other health insurance 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4%    
Insured but type unknown 0.1% 0.8% 0.8% 2.3%    
Cooperative medical scheme       2.5% 
GIS, LIS, etc.        1.4% 
SAH excellent 13% 13% 14% 14% 49.5% 36.9%  
SAH good 63% 64% 61% 50% 22.8% 33.1%  
SAH fair 21% 21% 22% 31% 21.0% 21.9%  
SAH poor 3% 3% 3% 5% 5.1% 6.2%  
SAH very poor     1.5% 1.8%  
Chronic illness       3.5% 
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Table 3 (contin.): Descriptive statistics, by survey and wave 
 CHNS GSCF H8BS 
 1991 1993 1997 2000 2000 2004 1998 
Per capita income (RMB) 1675.0 1324.5 1534.5 1392.7 1844.29 3351.85 825.61 
Years of schooling  15.28 15.29 16.78 17.87 13.56 16.77  
Age        28.96 
Gender       52.4% 
Han       81.8% 
Married        51.9% 
No. children under 5        0.36 
No education        23.7% 
Elementary school       31.2% 
Primary middle school       36.3% 
Senior middle school       7.4% 
Vocational school       1.1% 
Junior college       0.3% 
        
N 14034 13227 13604 14502 7580 7580 42581 
Note: CHNS panel is unbalanced because not all provinces were sampled in each wave (cf. Table 1), some households left the CHNS as it proceeded, but some were 
replaced by new households.   
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Table 4: Basic results for 1991-2000 CHNS panel  
 High out-of-pocket payments Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments 
Variable Sample Urban Rural Sample Urban Rural 
Health insurance 0.328 0.561 0.190 0.307 0.59 0.12 
  (2.20) (2.40) (0.97) (1.85) (2.20) (0.55) 
 0.069 0.113 0.041 0.074 0.145 0.029 
SAH good 0.353 0.197 0.419 0.241 0.036 0.357 
  (1.68) (0.56) (1.59) (1.04) (0.09) (1.24) 
SAH fair 1.218 1.151 1.243 0.997 0.638 1.184 
  (5.55) (3.16) (4.49) (4.15) (1.54) (3.97) 
SAH poor 2.432 1.947 2.627 2.233 1.656 2.474 
  (9.71) (4.51) (8.44) (8.29) (3.43) (7.48) 
Per capita income 70.888 39.156 101.722 -210.39 -205.95 -208.96 
  (1.54) (0.54) (1.69) (3.55) (2.29) (2.62) 
Years of schooling -0.008 0.000 -0.013 -0.009 -0.004 -0.012 
  (0.79) (0.02) (1.01) (0.83) (0.18) (0.92) 
1993 wave -0.634 -0.486 -0.711 -0.62 -0.569 -0.641 
  (5.87) (2.51) (5.41) (5.25) (2.55) (4.57) 
1997 wave -0.239 -0.122 -0.315 -0.154 -0.008 -0.224 
  (2.27) (0.63) (2.46) (1.35) (0.04) (1.65) 
2000 wave -0.036 -0.148 0.036 0.064 0.002 0.113 
  (0.34) (0.73) (0.28) (0.55) (0.01) (0.83) 
       
N 14905 5128 9796 14905 5128 9796 
Av. no. waves  2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.5 
Log likelihood  -906.84 -294.61 -607.02 -771.57 -225.51 -542.34 
Chi squared 300.265 71.902 238.779 265.023 58.704 213.762 
       
Prob value for hypothesis of  
constant effects across 
provinces  
0.037 0.952 0.027 0.310 0.901 0.270 
Note: Models are fixed effects logits, estimated on the 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000 waves of the CHNS. Income 
expressed in millions of RMB for the estimation. The first number for each covariate is the coefficient, the second 
(in parentheses) is the t-statistic, and the third (in italics, and listed only in the case of the insurance dummy) is the 
marginal effect (conditional on a zero fixed effect).   
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Table 5: Further results for 1991-2000 CHNS panel  
 High out-of-pocket payments Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments 
 Sample Urban Rural Sample Urban Rural 
Public insurance 0.237 0.413 0.052 -0.033 0.265 -0.275 
 (1.04) (1.26) (0.16) (0.12) (0.65) (0.75) 
 0.050 0.078 0.012 -0.008 0.065 -0.068 
Worker insurance 0.385 0.843 -0.340 0.367 0.850 -0.367 
 (1.61) (2.64) (0.85) (1.33) (2.31) (0.79) 
 0.079 0.144 -0.079 0.088 0.197 -0.091 
Dependents’ insurance -0.422 -0.171 -0.246 -0.104 0.200 -0.330 
 (0.45) (0.17) (0.09) (0.11) (0.19) (0.11) 
 -0.098 -0.035 -0.057 -0.026 0.049 -0.082 
Work unit insurance 0.328 0.279 0.380 0.420 0.370 0.467 
 (1.41) (0.56) (1.42) (1.63) (0.66) (1.58) 
 0.067 0.052 0.080 0.100 0.090 0.109 
Cooperative medical insurance 0.670 0.129 1.084 0.638 -0.077 1.097 
 (1.38) (0.18) (1.62) (1.20) (0.09) (1.58) 
 0.127 0.025 0.191 0.148 -0.019 0.228 
Other health insurance 0.912 1.472 -0.324 1.149 1.945 -0.865 
 (1.71) (2.29) (0.28) (1.97) (2.59) (0.65) 
 0.162 0.199 -0.076 0.243 0.355 -0.212 
Insured but type unknown -0.199 -0.523 0.467 -0.427 -1.043 0.325 
 (0.36) (0.65) (0.57) (0.62) (0.96) (0.31) 
 -0.045 -0.115 0.095 -0.106 -0.249 0.077 
       
N 14905 5128 9796 14905 5128 9796 
Av. no. waves  2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.5 
Log likelihood  -904.926 -290.578 -604.867 -768.446 -220.295 -539.586 
Chi squared 304.086 79.956 243.092 271.275 69.127 219.277 
Note: Models are fixed effects logits, estimated on the 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000 waves of the CHNS.  Equations 
include in addition to health insurance variables all the covariates in Table 4.  Income expressed in millions of 
RMB for the estimation. The first number for each covariate is the coefficient, the second (in parentheses) is the t-
statistic, and the third (in italics) is the marginal effect (conditional on a zero fixed effect).   
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Table 6: Results for 2000-2003 Gansu panel  
 High out-of-pocket payments Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments 
Health insurance 0.520 0.645 
  (3.76) (4.26) 
 0.126 0.155 
SAH good 0.287 0.314 
  (3.08) (3.00) 
SAH average 1.017 0.866 
  (10.15) (8.08) 
SAH poor 1.839 1.675 
 (12.13) (10.78) 
SAH very poor 2.263 1.946 
 (7.81) (7.25) 
Per capita income -0.331 -481.037 
  (0.13) (11.05) 
Years of schooling -0.013 -0.013 
  (1.48) (1.57) 
2000 wave -0.690 -0.280 
 (11.67) (4.30) 
   
N 7580 7580 
Av. no. waves  2.0 2.0 
Log likelihood  -1158.29 -1005.97 
Chi squared 403.33 457.043 
 
Note: Models are fixed effects logits, estimated on the two waves of the GSCF.  The first 
number for each covariate is the coefficient, the second (in parentheses) is the t-statistic, and 
the third (in italics) is the marginal effect (conditional on a zero fixed effect).   
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Table 7: Results for 1998 Health VIII baseline survey  
 ‘High’ payments Catastrophic payments Out-of-pocket payments 
Variable Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit OLS IV  
CMS -0.481 -0.749 -0.968 -1.040 -41.652 -48.269 
 (12.03) (10.40) (16.05) (11.89) (9.05) (5.83) 
 -0.190 -0.289 -0.258 -0.269   
GIS, LIS, etc. 0.078 0.599 0.073 0.536 19.361 90.995 
 (1.33) (4.15) (1.20) (3.67) (2.92) (5.82) 
 0.030 0.209 0.027 0.208   
Chronic  0.724 0.717 0.803 0.797 93.843 93.197 
 (16.86) (16.63) (20.47) (20.28) (21.65) (21.45) 
Per capita income 186 187 -950 -953 21099 20710 
 (16.00) (15.96) (53.67) (53.50) (18.02) (17.45) 
Gender  -0.031 -0.033 -0.016 -0.018 -0.357 -0.679 
 (2.26) (2.42) (1.14) (1.28) (0.23) (0.43) 
Han 0.133 0.132 0.081 0.080 0.492 0.416 
 (7.04) (6.94) (4.03) (3.99) (0.22) (0.19) 
Married  0.000 0.000 -0.023 -0.024 -7.121 -7.336 
 0.00 (0.02) (1.05) (1.10) (2.90) (2.98) 
No. children aged less than 5 0.045 0.045 0.033 0.033 2.116 2.246 
 (3.95) (3.92) (2.73) (2.76) (1.59) (1.68) 
Elementary school 0.032 0.030 0.005 0.001 1.650 0.965 
 (1.62) (1.53) (0.25) (0.05) (0.73) (0.43) 
Primary middle school 0.147 0.144 0.048 0.043 1.310 0.461 
 (7.17) (6.97) (2.22) (2.00) (0.55) (0.19) 
Senior middle school 0.278 0.267 0.180 0.168 11.195 9.112 
 (9.21) (8.78) (5.74) (5.30) (3.24) (2.61) 
Vocational school 0.204 0.137 0.099 0.033 10.891 0.660 
 (2.90) (1.88) (1.30) (0.42) (1.36) (0.08) 
Junior college 0.172 0.059 0.275 0.178 43.513 28.253 
 (1.39) (0.47) (2.15) (1.36) (3.08) (1.95) 
Constant  -0.203 -0.195 0.211 0.216 59.852 60.682 
 (6.21) (5.94) (6.01) (6.15) (15.83) (16.00) 
       
N 36616 36616 36616 36616 36616 36616 
Log likelihood  -24400 -24400 -21700 -21800   
Chi squared -1001 -983 -4445 -4227   
 
Note: Equations include age and age squared in addition to variables listed. The first number for each covariate is 
the coefficient, the second (in parentheses) is the t-statistic, and the third (in italics, indicated only in the case of the 
insurance dummies) is the marginal effect.   
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